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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international 
developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While 
traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on 
global developments has become clearer.2 As underlined by the preceding two chapters, 
international law has continued to play a key role not only in the EU’s external relations, but 
also in the Union’s own legal order.3 
 The purpose of this chapter is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in 
international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat 
                                                
1 R.A. Wessel is Professor of International and European Institutional Law, Centre for European Studies, 
University of Twente, The Netherlands; S. Blockmans is Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy 
Studies (Brussels), and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam 
(part-time). Both authors are members of the governing board of the Centre for the Law of EU External 
Relations (CLEER), The Hague. 
2 See R.A. Wessel and S. Blockmans (eds), Between Autonomy and Dependence: The EU Legal Order under the 
Influence of International Organisations (The Hague, Asser Press, 2013).  
3 For a recent overview see also R.A. Wessel, Close Encounters of the Third Kind: The Interface Between the 
EU and International Law after the Lisbon Treaty (Stockholm, Sieps Report, 2013); as well as the contributions 
to E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and R.A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 
4 Over the past years this topic was addressed by political scientists in particular. See for instance E. Drieskens 
and L. van Schaik (eds), The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal and External Reform Practices 
(London, Routledge, 2014); K.E. Jørgensen and K.V. Laatikainen (eds), Routledge Handbook on the European 
Union and International Institutions: Performance, Policy, Power (London, Routledge, 2013); and S. Oberthür, 
K.E. Jørgensen and J. Shahin (eds), The Performance of the EU in International Institutions (London, 
Routledge, 2013) (also published in Journal of European Integration, 2011); S. Blavoukos and D. Bourantonis 
 
  2 
under-researched topic: the legal status of the decisions of international organisations in the 
EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of 
international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of 
international organisations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it 
has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already 
complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the 
possible difference between decisions of international organisations of which the EU is a 
member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organisations where it is not (irrespective of 
existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the 
hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them 
being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. 
 This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organisations 
by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily 
comply with the standard definition of international organisations,7 be it bodies set-up by 
multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies 
are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – 
see further Section five below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to 
                                                                                                                                                   
(eds), The EU Presence in International Organisations (London, Routledge, 2011); K.E. Jørgensen (ed), The 
European Union and International Organisations (London, Routledge, 2009). Yet lawyers have also assessed 
the role of the EU in international organisations: R. Frid, The Relations between the EC and International 
Organisations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1995); J. Sack, ‘The European Community’s Membership 
of International Organisations’(1995) Common Market Law Review 1127-1256; S. Marchisio, ‘EU’s 
Membership in International Organisations’ in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in 
International Relations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002) 231-260; F. Hoffmeister, ‘Outsider of 
Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European Law on the Status of the European Union 
in International Organisations and Treaty Bodies’ (2007) Common Market Law Review 41-68; R.A. Wessel, 
‘The Legal Framework for the Participation of the European Union in International Institutions’ (2011) Journal 
of European Integration 621–635; S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel (eds), Principles and Practices of EU 
External Representation, (The Hague: CLEER Working Paper series, 2012); J. Wouters, J. Odermatt and Th. 
Ramopoulos, ‘The Status of the European Union at the United Nations General Assembly’ in I. Govaere et al. 
(eds), The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2014) 211-223. 
5  With the notable exception of N. Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International 
Organisations and European Law, (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2004) this topic has received 
surprisingly little attention in academic publications. See earlier also D. Bethlehem, ‘International Law, EC Law, 
National Law: Three Systems in Search of A Framework’, in M. Koskenniemi (ed), International law Aspects of 
the EU (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) 169-196. For a specific category see also: B. 
Martenczuk, ‘EC Law-Making Through International Bodies’ in V. Kronenberger (ed), The European Union 
and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001) 141-163. 
6 Martenczuk, ‘EC Law-Making’ 162.  In this citation ‘Community’ was replaced by ‘Union’. 
7 International organisations can be defined in many ways. The most recent definition laid down in an 
international legal document may very well be the one of the International Law Commission in the 2011 Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organisations (see below), which defined an international organization as 
‘an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own 
international legal personality. International organisations may include as members, in addition to States, other 
entities.’ See more extensively S. Bouwhuis, ‘The International law Commission’s Definition of International 
Organisations’ (2012) International Organisations Law Review 451–465. The definition by Schermers and 
Blokker is also commonly used: ‘international organisations are defined as forms of cooperation (1) founded on 
an international agreement; (2) having at least one organ with a will of its own; and (3) established under 
international law.’ H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity 
(Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 37. 
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formal international organisations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the 
European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by 
these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative 
output of international institutional arrangements. 
 
 
2. ‘INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS’: THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
Assessing the status of decisions of international organisations as a separate category in the 
EU’s legal order implies that these decisions can be a source of law. Whereas treaties 
(international agreements) and custom are undisputed as sources of international law and are 
as such also mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the 
role and function of decisions of international organisations in international law is less clear. 
Yet by now the notion that international organisations can take decisions and that these 
decisions may be legally binding is well-accepted.8 International organisations have found 
their place in global governance,9 and are even considered ‘autonomous actors’, following an 
agenda that is no longer fully defined by their Member States,10 which has caused the latter to 
devote much of their time and energy to responding to what has been termed the 
‘Frankenstein problem’.11 
 There is nothing new in arguing that international organisations engage in decision-
making in a sense that can even be viewed as ‘law-making’.12 Apart from the fact that states 
(but also the EU) may use international organisations as frameworks for treaty-making, it is 
well-accepted that also many decisions of international organisations can be seen as ‘law’.13 
Institutional law-making has moved beyond the traditional methods and actors and is 
increasingly studied in a broader sense, including new actors and new regulatory activities.14 
                                                
8 Schermers and Blokker, International Institutional Law 832 et seq. 
9 I.F. Dekker and R.A. Wessel, ‘Governance by International Organisations: Rethinking the Source and 
Normative Force of International Decisions’ in I.F. Dekker and W. Werner (eds), Governance and International 
Legal Theory (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 215-236. 
10 N.D. White and R. Collins (eds), International Organisations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional 
Independence in the International Legal Order (Routledge, 2011). 
11  A. Guzman, ‘International Organisations and the Frankenstein Problem’ (2013) European Journal of 
International Law 999-1025; Cf. also J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, 2nd edn 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
12 Cf. A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) vii: 
‘Law-making is no longer the exclusive preserve of states’. The scope of this chapter does not allow us to 
address the notion of ‘law’ and the question of its sources. Yet obviously, using the term ‘law-making’ somehow 
implies that we accept legal effects of the norms addressed here, be it through customary law or simply because 
we accept the competence of the international institutions to enact legal norms. 
13 One of the most influential books may very well have been J. Alvarez, International Organisations as Law-
Makers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
14  J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012) and A. Berman, S. Duquet, J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel, and J. Wouters (eds), Informal 
International Lawmaking: Case Studies (Oslo, TOAEP, 2013). 
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The role of many international institutions has developed well beyond a ‘facilitation 
forum’, underlining their autonomous position in the global legal order.15 In those cases law-
making takes place on the basis of well-defined procedures with an involvement of 
institutional actors other than states, but also on the basis of a sometimes dynamic 
interpretation of the original law-making mandate of the organization.16 Indeed, the outcome 
comes closer to a decision of an international organization than to an international agreement 
concluded between states. In fact, it could be argued that this is what ‘institutional law-
making’ is all about: it is law-making by international institutions (be it formal international 
organisations or other international bodies17) and less about law-making through international 
institutions (although the latter continues to exist in the form of for instance Conferences of 
States Parties of multilateral conventions or bodies set up by these conventions).18  It has even 
become quite common to regard these types of acts as contributing to the development of 
‘world legislation’.19 Yet, situations clearly differ. While some international organisations are 
well-established and display ‘autonomous’ powers, in other cases institutionalisation is ‘light’ 
and serves as an ad hoc vehicle for a multilateral diplomatic process. In these cases 
conferences are not much more that meeting points, facilitating states to conclude treaties.20 
Similar processes also take place within more permanent structures, including formal 
international organisations. Obvious examples include the UN General Assembly21 and the 
UN specialised agencies.22 In these cases an important function of international organisations 
is to reveal state practice (and opinio juris23) and to allow for a speedy creation of customary 
                                                
15 R. Collins and N.D. White (eds), International Organisations and the Idea of Autonomy: Institutional 
Independence in the International Legal Order (London, Routledge, 2011). 
16 J. Wouters and P. De Man, ‘International Organisations as Law-Makers’ in J. Klabbers and Å. Wallendahl 
(eds), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organisations (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011) 190-224 at 192: ‘It is possible […] that the treaty provisions pertaining to the law-making powers of the 
organization will be construed in a different way than was originally intended by the drafting nations, as it 
proves very difficult to draft an instrument in such a manner as to effectively preclude any other possible 
interpretation.’ 
17 Cf. for instance M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Law-making and International Environmental Law: the legal Character of 
Decisions of Conference of the Parties’ in R. Liijova and J. Petman (eds), International Law-Making: Essays in 
Honour of Jan Klabbers (London, Routledge, 2014) 190-210; and in the same vol G. Ulfstein, ‘Law-making by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 249-257. 
18 See more extensively R.A. Wessel, ‘Institutional Law-Making: The Development of a Global Normative 
Web’ in C. Bröllman and Y. Radi (eds), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Law-
Making (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014). See on these two dimensions of international 
organisations J. Klabbers, ‘Two Concepts of International Organization’ (2005) International Organisations 
Law Review 277-293; as well as his ‘Contending Approaches to International Organisations: Between 
Functionalism and Constitutionalism’ in Klabbers and Wallendahl, Research Handbook 3-30. 
19 See the different contributions to the forum on ‘World Legislation’ (2011) 1 International Organisations Law 
Review. Cf. H.J. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law 1066 para 1657 ‘It is submitted 
that international organisations empowered to issue Decisions have legislative capacity’. 
20 Wouters and De Man, ‘International Organisations’ fn 16 at 205 have argued that in these cases International 
organisations ‘merely act as agents, since they only propose draft conventions through gathering information and 
offering their expertise, which then may or may not be entered into by the member states’. 
21 Following Art 13 of the UN Charter, which refers to its responsibility for ‘encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification’. 
22 See for examples also Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law 124-141. 
23 Cf. the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Legality of the treat or use of nuclear weapons[1996] ICJ Rep. 226: 
‘General Assembly resolutions […] can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing 
the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinion juris. To establish whether this is true of a given General 
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law, although one needs to remain aware of the distinction between state practice and the 
practice of an international organization.24 Furthermore, the fact that many international 
conventions incorporate generally accepted international rules, standards, regulations, 
procedures and/or practices may effectively transform a number of codes, guidelines and 
standards created by international organisations and bodies into binding norms. This reveals 
the complexity of institutional decision-making: it is not just about clearly legally binding 
decisions of international organisations; it may very well be about an acceptance of rules and 
standards because there is simply nothing else and the rules need to be followed in order for 
states to be able to play along. At the same time international organisations often adopt rules 
or standards developed in another organization and with less than 200 states they are bound to 
run into each other in many different institutions. 
‘International decisions’ may perhaps also take shape in the form of ‘case law’ rather 
than as decisions of an organ of an international organization. The legal order of the European 
Union has largely been shaped on the basis of case law that, allegedly, went beyond what 
states originally (though to have) agreed on in the treaties. Less prominent examples may be 
found in other international organisations. Thus, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
has been said to be proof of the organization’s ‘legislative’ or ‘adjudicative’ powers.25 
Finally, the set of international institutions encompasses not only formal international 
organisations, but also other international bodies, consisting of governmental representatives 
and/or other stakeholders. There are indications that these international decisions outnumber 
the traditional forms.26 In the study of institutional decision-making it became clear that many 
norms originate in other international bodies or form part of a much broader international 
debate, including many different actors. The emerging picture is one of a broad range of 
international normative fora, from intergovernmental organisations with a broad mandate (see 
above), treaty-based conferences that do not amount to an international organization (e.g. 
Conferences of the Parties under the main multilateral environmental agreements, such as the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol), informal 
intergovernmental co-operative structures (e.g. the G20, the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), and even private 
organisations that are active in the public domain (e.g. the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), or private regulation of the internet by the Internet Corporation for 
                                                                                                                                                   
Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary 
to see whether an opinion juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the 
gradual evolution of the opinion juris required for the establishment of a new rule.’ 
24 Wouters and De Man, ‘International Organisations’ 207-208. Once consensus has been reached within an 
international organization, it will be difficult for states to deny their acceptance of a norm and to be recognised 
as a ‘persistent objector’. See for the decision-making powers of many international organisations and other 
international bodies: J. Alvarez, International Organisations as Law-Makers (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
25 See in particular: N. Lavranos, Decisions of International Organisations in the European and Domestic Legal 
Orders of Selected EU Member States (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2004). 
26 See J. Pauwelyn, J. Wouters and R.A. Wessel, ‘When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics 
in International Lawmaking’ (2014) European Journal of International Law but also Pauwelyn, Wessel and 
Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking 
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Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) or the 
Internet Society (ISOC).27  
  Given the EU’s connection to all these different formal and informal normative 
processes, the question is to what extent international decisions impact the EU’s legal order. 
The following sections will address this question in more detail. 
 
 
3. THE EU TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
Apart from changes in the roles of international organisations, the relation between the EU 
and international organisations has also changed. From a political science perspective 
Jørgensen pointed to the idea that “reactive policies have been left behind […]. [W]hereas the 
European Union in the past may have been an organization in need of learning about 
international affairs, the European Union now seems to master several of the disciplines of 
international relations.”28 And, as will be highlighted below: there seems to be a ‘two-way 
flow of influence’ which includes both an instrumental use by the EU of international 
organisations and an influence of international organisations on EU policies and policy-
making.29 
The current EU Treaties reflect this new interest in international organisations (see 
below). Apart from its participation in a number of actual international organisations, the 
institutionalization of the role of the EU in the world is reflected in its position in international 
regimes in various policy fields, either as a full member or as an observer.30 The position of 
the EU in international institutions is part and parcel of EU external relations law and it is at 
these fora that a structural role of the EU in global governance becomes most visible. 
Moreover, it is this role that has become more interesting now that it becomes clear that many 
EU (and national) rules find their origin in decision-making processes in other international 
organisations. 
It is generally held that the participation in a formal international organization relates 
to the participation in its organs; i.e. the right to attend the meetings, being elected for 
functions in the organ, and exercising voting and speaking rights. In that sense the term 
influence is related to the output of the international organization (UN, ICAO, etc.): decisions 
(often recommendations, in some occasions binding decisions) and conventions (international 
agreements prepared and adopted by an organ of an international organization). In addition, 
the EU participates in less formal international institutions (or regimes) such as the G-20 for 
example. The Treaties herald an increase of the engagement of the EU in other international 
                                                
27 More extensively on the normative activities of these bodies: R.A. Wessel, ‘Regulating Technological 
Innovation through Informal International Law: The Exercise of International Public Authority by Transnational 
Actors’ in M.A. Heldeweg and E. Kica (eds), Regulating Technological Innovation: A Multidisciplinary 
Approach (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) 77-94. 
28 Jørgensen, The European Union and International Organisations 4-5. 
29 ibid. 
30 F. Hoffmeister, 'Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European Law on the 
Status of the European Union in International Organisations and Treaty Bodies' (2007) 44 Common Market Law 
Review 41-68. Parts of this section are also dealt with more extensively in B. van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU 
External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014) ch 8. 
  7 
institutions, including the future membership of additional international organisations such as 
the Council of Europe (Article 6 TEU).  
The absence of a clear and explicit competence means that the participation in (and the 
membership of) international institutions is predominantly based on implied powers, which 
find their source in the general competences the Union enjoys in the different policy fields. 
Thus, the Union’s membership of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is based on 
Articles 43 TFEU (agriculture and fisheries), 207 TFEU (commercial policy) and 209 TFEU 
(development cooperation). However, as we will see below, there are specific policy areas 
where cooperation with international organisations is expressly incorporated into the TFEU.  
What comes closest to a general competence-conferring provision is Article 211 
TFEU: ‘Within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States 
shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organisations.’ That 
this ‘cooperation’ may also lead to the establishment of legal relationships can be derived 
from the provisions creating a competence for the Union to conclude international 
agreements. Article 216(1) TFEU also refers to international organisations: ‘The Union may 
conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where 
the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to 
achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the 
Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules 
or alter their scope.’. And Article 217 TFEU adds: ‘The Union may conclude with one or 
more third countries or international organisations agreements establishing an association 
involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedure.’ 
The procedures to conclude these international agreements are to be found in Articles 
218 and 219(3) TFEU. So-called, ‘constitutive agreements’ by which new international 
organisations are created, or accession agreements to acquire membership of an international 
organization are not excluded. In fact, in Opinion 1/76 the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has established that the EU’s competences in the field of external relation 
included the power to create new international organisations.31 Both the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and the ‘associations’ created by association agreements serve as examples of 
international organisations created by (at that time) the European Community. At the same 
time, in Opinion 1/94 the Court implicitly accepted a role of the EU as one of the founding 
members of the WTO. Although not explicitly regulated, this also seems to imply a 
competence of the EU to fully participate in so-called ‘treaty-regimes’, on the basis of a 
formal accession to a treaty (e.g. the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol, which were formally ratified by the European Union in 1993 and 2002 
respectively). As in formal international organisations, participation of the EU is either based 
on decisions by the participating states to grant the EU observer or full participant status, or 
on the inclusion of a Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO) clause in 
international conventions.32 For example, Article II of the FAO Constitution was specifically 
                                                
31 Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels [1977] 
ECR 741, para 5. 
32 See on the qualification of the EU as an international (integration) organization also C. Eckes and R.A. 
Wessel, ‘The European Union: An International Perspective’ in T. Tridimas and R. Schütze (eds), The Oxford 
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modified to allow for the accession of ‘regional economic organisations’. A REIO is 
commonly defined in UN protocols and conventions as “an organization constituted by 
sovereign states of a given region to which its Member States have transferred competence in 
respect of matters governed by […] convention or its protocols and [which] has been duly 
authorised, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or 
accede to it [the instruments concerned].”.33 In the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, the REIO clause seems to have evolved to a RIO (Regional 
Integration Organization) clause, which does justice to the large scope of activities of the EU 
these days. In Article 44 of that Convention, a “’Regional integration organization’ shall 
mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member 
States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention.” Since 
Member States usually have retained certain competences, ‘mixed agreements’ are the 
appropriate instrument for the EU and its Member States to engage in international 
institutions in which both participate fully.  
Express competences are not always needed for the EU to join an international 
organization by concluding an international agreement. It is well known that, ever since the 
1971 ERTA case, the CJEU also acknowledged the treaty-making capacity of the Union in 
cases where this was not explicitly provided for by the Treaty. This means that international 
agreements, including the ones whereby the EU becomes a member of another international 
organization or participates in a treaty-regime (Opinion 1/94 WTO), may also be based on the 
external dimension of an internal competence. This is also confirmed by Article 216(1) 
TFEU, which – as we have seen − explicitly refers to international organisations: “The Union 
may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations 
[…].”  At least to establish membership of the EU in international organisations, this 
provision seems to give a broad mandate to the EU to also conclude international agreements 
in order to become a member of an international organization or to join a treaty-regime.  
Irrespective of these more general indications of a competence to engage in 
international institutions, the Treaties explicitly refer to a number of specific policy terrains or 
international organisations. Thus, Article 37 TEU allows for international agreements to be 
concluded “with one or more states or international organisations” in the area of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Similar provisions may be found in relation to 
development for cooperation (Article 209(2) TFEU), economic, financial and technical 
cooperation (Article 212(3) TFEU) and humanitarian aid (Article 214(4) TFEU).  In the 
environmental sphere, the Treaty reads that “Within their respective spheres of competence, 
the Union and the Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent 
international organisations” (Article 191(4) TFEU). In the field of humanitarian aid, the 
Treaty refers to “international organisations and bodies, in particular those forming part of the 
United Nations system” to coordinate operations with (Article 214(7) TFEU). The United 
Nations (and its Charter) is also mentioned in relation to a number of other policy areas of the 
Union (Articles 3(5) TEU, 21(1-2) TEU, 34(2) TEU, 42(1 and 7) TEU, 208(2) TFEU, 214(7) 
                                                                                                                                                   
Principles of European Union Law − vol 1: The European Union Legal Order (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
33 See for instance Arts 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5, 21 and 22 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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TFEU, and 220(1) TFEU) (see also below). In relation to development cooperation a number 
of provisions have been included explicitly to strengthen commitments of both the Union and 
its Member States in that area. Thus, Article 208(2) TFEU provides the following: “The 
Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent 
international organisations.” Article 210(1) TFEU adds to that an obligation of coordination, 
which means concretely that the EU and Member States must take account of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), and their planned post-2015 follow-up (‘Sustainable 
Development Goals’ or SDGs), drawn up in the context of the United Nations. In addition one 
may come across some references in relation to the European Central Bank and the European 
Investment Bank (see Protocols Nos. 434 and 5 to the Treaty (Article 14)). A somewhat more 
general provision, and the first one in a specific Treaty Title on ‘The Union’s Relations with 
International Organisations and Third Countries and Union Delegations’ is Article 220(1) 
TFEU: “The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation with the organs of the 
United Nations and its specialised agencies, the Council of Europe, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. The Union shall also maintain such relations as are appropriate with other 
international organisations.” 
This short overview reveals that the competences of the EU in relation to international 
institutions are fragmented and scattered across the Treaties. Apart from these competences of 
the EU itself, many of the provisions relate to ‘cooperation’ or to the role of Member States. 
Thus, the idea to foster cooperation with third countries and competent international 
organisations returns in fields of education and sport (Art. 165(3) TFEU), vocational training 
(Article 166(3) TFEU), culture (Article 167(3) TFEU) and public health (Article 168(3) 
TFEU). A similar promotion of cooperation with other international organisations is 
mentioned in relation to social policy (Article 156 TFEU) and cooperation in Union research, 
technological development and demonstration (Article 180(b) TFEU). In addition, the 
Union’s foreign and security policy includes a number of rules on the way in which the EU 
wishes to present itself in international organisations, including the representation by the High 
Representative (Article 27(2) TEU), the cooperation between diplomatic missions of the 
Member States and the Union delegations (Article 33 and 35 TEU), the coordination of 
Member States’ actions (Art. 34 TEU) and the general competence to conclude international 
agreements with international organisations in the area of CFSP (Article 37 TEU). 
 Finally, the EU Treaties present the United Nations and its Charter as the guiding legal 
framework for the EU in its external relations. Article 3(5) TEU mentions “respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter” as part of the “the strict observance and the 
development of international law” which are to be pursued by the EU. Similar wordings 
reappear in Article 21 TEU of the general provisions on the Union’s external action. In fact, 
the promotion of “multilateral solutions to common problems” should be done “in particular 
in the framework of the United Nations” (emphasis added). Finally, as reflected in the 
Preamble to the TFEU, UN law not only guides the external relations of the Union, but also 
                                                
34 Art 6(2): ‘The ECB and, subject to its approval, the national central banks may participate in international 
monetary institutions.’ See also Art 23 on external operations. 
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its internal relation with its overseas countries. The Member States announced that they intend 
to “confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to 
ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations.” 
Article 42(1) TEU provides that the Union may use its civilian and military assets 
missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security, and again this should be done “in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter.” In fact, the Treaties foresee the possibility of EU missions operating 
in a UN framework. The preamble of Protocol 10 to the Treaties refers to the fact that “the 
United Nations Organization may request the Union's assistance for the urgent 
implementation of missions undertaken under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations 
Charter.” Similarly, UN law forms the legal framework for actions in relation to the new 
collective defence obligation in Article 42(7) TEU: “If a Member State is the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid 
and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter [the provision on (collective) self-defence].” 
The attention to the United Nations and its principles in the EU treaties is thus 
overwhelming. In fact, the United Nations is referred to 19 times in the current EU treaties 
(including the Protocols and Declarations). Irrespective of the CJEU’s judgment in the Kadi 
cases, which seemed to emphasise the Union’s own principles,35 the EU member states which 
signed the Lisbon Treaty obviously regard many of the EU's actions as being part of a global 
governance programme. With a view to the legal regime governing the EU-UN relations, one 
may conclude that most of the provisions aim to regulate EU policy in a substantive, rather 
than an institutional manner. EU foreign policy is to take place within the limits set by UN 
law. This holds true for external relations in general, and for CFSP, CSDP, and development 
cooperation in particular. Much less the treaties offer institutional improvements to allow the 
EU and the UN to become ‘partners in multilateralism’.36 
 
 
4. THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS ON THE EU: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Given these extensive references in the EU treaties to international organisations (indicating 
even an occasional voluntary dependence of the EU on international decisions), the question 
is to what extent decisions of these organisations actually impact the EU. Over the years many 
empirical case studies revealed an influence of international organisations on the EU, 
including a possibility that international organisations have been ‘teaching’ the European 
Union, in particular in areas where it was a relative newcomer (such as health (the WHO), the 
                                                
35 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351; and Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission et al v 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECR, n.y.r. 
36 J. Wouters, The United Nations and the European Union: Partners In Multilateralism (Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies, Working Paper 1, 2007). 
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monetary and financial system (IMF, and World Bank) or international security (NATO)).37 
Research – including a project lead by the present authors38 – has furthermore shown that we 
also witness a normative influence of international organisations on the EU legal order and 
that this may put the cherished ‘autonomy’ of that order into perspective.39 
The influence of international norms varies considerably and reflects the constant 
struggle between an openness to international law and norms developed at the international 
level and the idea of an autonomous legal order that is there for the Court to preserve. 
Obviously, ‘influence’ is a matter of degree and here we use it to denote the effect of norms 
created in or by international organisations on EU norms. The issue can be approached from 
two sides: the international organization in question should have the capacity or power to 
exercise its influence (there has to be an institutional and substantive link), and the EU must 
be willing or compelled to ‘receive’ the influence. Influence is not a legal concept and 
lawyers are not used to working with it (perhaps because it would imply the actual 
‘measuring’ of effects – something that is also beyond the scope of the present Chapter). In 
their recent book, Oriol Costa and Knud Erik Jørgensen reveal that “under certain 
circumstances international institutions [indeed] shape both policies and policy-making 
processes, even in ways sometimes unintended by the EU, or undesired by some member 
states”.40 They point to the fact that in IR-theory different ‘mechanisms’ to exert influence 
have been noticed, which may (1) provide opportunities or constraints to actors, (2) change 
their ability to influence decision-making by changing the distribution of power, (3) establish 
or spread norms and rules, or (4) create path dependencies. The emerging picture is a complex 
set of formal and (sometimes very subtle) informal ways in which international organisations 
(and other multilateral fora) influence the EU. The degree of influence may then also depend 
on the ‘institutional strength’ of the international organization. Some research showed that 
“international institutions embodied in toothless non-binding agreements should have less 
influence on the EU then fully-fledged international institutions including binding treaties and 
meetings of regular fora.”41 At the same time, it is well-known that ‘domestic conditions’ are 
an important factor for the degree of influence.42 
In the end, IR-theory teaches us that the different mechanisms and degrees of 
influence may have different consequences. Apart from ‘normative influence’, it is equally 
possible to find elements of ‘institutional consequences’, including the role EU and Member 
State actors can play in international institutions and the way in which formal decision-
making processes are used in practice. There is indeed an interaction between the EU and 
many international organisations, underlining the coming of age of the European Union as a 
polity. Whereas for an international organization like the EU43 stressing its autonomy is 
necessary to establish its position both vis-à-vis its own Member states and in the global legal 
                                                
37 Jørgensen, The European Union and International Organisations 8-9. 
38 Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 
39 J.W. van Rossem, ‘The Autonomy of EU Law: More is Less?’ in Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy 
and Dependence 13-46.  
40 O. Costa and K.E. Jørgensen (eds), The Influence of International Institutions on the EU (London, Palgrave 
2012). 
41 As paraphrased by Costa and Jørgensen, The Influence of International Institutions on the EU 
42 ibid. 
43 Indeed, we consider the EU as an international organization. See Eckes and Wessel, ‘The European Union’. 
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order, its further development sets the limits to that autonomy. In many policy areas the EU 
has become a global player and everything it does cannot be disconnected for normative 
processes that take place in other international organisations. This process does come with the 
same tension that sovereign states face, i.e. how to square the preservation of one’s 
institutional and constitutional values with accepting a certain dependence on the outside 
world. 
More legally oriented research seems to support the findings of political scientists and 
IR-theorists: international decisions also normatively influence the creation and interpretation 
of EU decisions,44 and – more generally – global, EU and domestic norms are increasingly 
interconnected.45  A recent research project reveals that the influence of international norms 
varies considerably and reflects the constant struggle between an openness to international 
law and norms developed at the international level and the idea of an autonomous legal order 
that is there for the CJEU to preserve. 46 The picture emerging from this study is a complex set 
of formal and (sometimes very subtle) informal ways in which international organisations and 
other multilateral fora influence the EU. The degree of the normative influence of 
international bodies on the EU and its legal order depends on a raft of factors, ranging from 
the binding obligations resulting from EU membership and full participation in other 
international organisations, to the voluntary reception or outright rejection of international 
norms by the EU legislator and Court of Justice. At the same time, ‘domestic conditions’ are 
also an important factor for the degree of influence. Whereas the EU is a unique and very 
complex legal construction, the separateness of the EU both from national and international 
law are still propagated by the Court of Justice’s autonomous interpretation of EU law and its 
exclusive jurisdiction therein. In view of globalisation’s growing interconnectedness between 
all sorts of subjects of international law, and the waning economic and financial power of the 
European Union on the international plane, the Court’s refusal to take account of international 
law in order to protect the unity of the internal market becomes increasingly untenable. This is 
all the more so because the Court’s recently displayed attitude towards the reception of 
international law in the EU legal order forms an impediment to meeting the EU’s 
constitutional duties in its relations with the wider world, most notably full respect for 
international law, whether this emanates from international organisations with legal 
personality or less institutionalised international regimes. 
There is thus empirical evidence of the intense legal interactions between the EU and a 
representative body of international institutions and we will mention some key examples, 
                                                
44 See the contributions to Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence. That we are not only 
dealing with formal decisions by formal international organisations, but also with norms created in other 
(informal/regulatory) bodies flows from the many case studies in the ‘informal international lawmaking’ project: 
J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012); and A. Berman, S. Duquet J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel, and J. Wouters, (eds), Informal International 
Lawmaking: Case Studies (The Hague, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012). 
45 A. Føllesdal, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds), Multilevel Regulation and the EU: The Interplay between 
Global, European and National Normative Processes (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). Earlier see 
already Bethlehem, ‘International Law, EC Law, National Law’ 195: ‘Just like a web, or net is made up of 
numerous strands criss-crossing at various point while, at the same time, going in different directions, so is the 
relationship between international law, Community law and national law; interacting constantly even though the 
focus may be slightly different’. 
46 Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 
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without attempting to be exhaustive, and mainly drawing on an earlier research project on this 
topic led by the present authors.47 The influence of Security Council resolutions has been 
given abundant attention in relation to the Kadi saga. And will for that reason not be dealt 
with extensively here. 48  But also other rules, standards, codes of conduct, guidelines, 
principles, recommendations and best practices developed within a variety of international 
organisations and bodies influence the development of EU law, even if they are not strictly 
legally binding upon the Union. Thus, norms developed within several bodies, be it within the 
UN family such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and the World Health Organization (WHO), or the OECD, the G20 and some of 
the machinery this ‘international regime’ has brought to life, such as the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), and specific bodies bringing together financial watchdogs like the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) – have been dealt with within the EU legislature and/or judiciary. As 
it happens, the Union seems to have a somewhat ambivalent relationship with international 
bodies and the numerous norms they develop. The EU legislature demonstrates openness 
towards these norms and often directly refers to the international processes that led to their 
development. This is the case especially where the EU is represented in the international body 
concerned, helps to shape the rules, and where the EU has an interest in seeing them 
implemented. Indeed, much of the EU’s recent legislation in financial governance explicitly 
mentions commitments made at the international level, in particular within the G20. In case 
law, however, the Court of Justice of the EU has rarely relied on norms emanating from these 
bodies in a substantive fashion. While the CJEU sometimes refers to such norms, it has often 
given a more autonomous meaning to the EU rules concerned. 49 
An analysis of the impact of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the EU legal order reveals that the Court has so 
far not accepted that it must be bound by the decisions of any external (quasi-)judicial body. 
Yet both EU law (Article 6(3) TEU) and the status of the European Charter of Human Rights 
(ECHR) (a “constitutional instrument of European public order”) can be cited in support of 
the argument that the decisions of the ECtHR require and deserve greater force than the 
decisions of other external (quasi-)judicial bodies, including the WTO dispute settlement 
bodies. With the Member States enjoying the convenience, the EU has taken over 
adjudication in the WTO. Eckes has observed that the negotiations surrounding the accession 
of the EU to the ECHR provide the most recent example where the EU’s autonomy concern 
has posed and will continue to pose many questions.50 More in general a number of Council 
of Europe conventions are today part of the EU’s acquis in the field of freedom, security and 
                                                
47 The project ‘Between Autonomy and Dependence’ was initiated by the Centre for the Law of EU External 
Relations (CLEER) in The Hague and resulted, inter alia, in the edited vol mentioned above (Wessel and 
Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence). Cf. also Føllesdal, Wessel and Wouters, Multilevel 
Regulation and the EU. 
48 See among the many publications on this issue A. Gattini, ‘Effects of Decisions of the UN Security Council in 
the EU Legal Order’ in Cannizzaro et al, International Law as Law of the European Union 215-227. 
49 J. Wouters and J. Odermatt, ‘Norms Emanating from International Bodies and Their Role in the Legal Order 
of the European Union’ in Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 47-68. 
50 C. Eckes, ‘The European Court of Justice and (Quasi-)Judicial Bodies of International Organisations’ in 
Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 85-109. 
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justice (e.g., the 2008 Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, and the 2000 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
European Union aimed at supplementing and facilitating the application, between the EU 
Member States, of the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters).51 
The influence of the WTO on the EU cannot be overstated. WTO primary and 
secondary law have had a considerable influence on EU primary and secondary law and their 
interpretation. Much of the EU's primary law on the free circulation of goods has been 
inspired by GATT 1947, and the integration of new trade subjects into the WTO 1994 
triggered a constitutional process of expanding the EU's exclusive powers concerning 
commercial policy. Moreover, many pieces of secondary EU legislation either transpose 
WTO norms or have been modified to bring them into line with world trade standards after 
adverse WTO judicial decisions. The underlying reason for this openness may be that the 
EU's political institutions expect WTO rules in this area to have been largely influenced by its 
own practice on the matter and are thus considered to be fully legitimate.52 
While IMF law as such has a limited influence on EU law in the sense of the IMF’s 
power to affect EU law, it nevertheless impacts EU law, both directly and indirectly. First, EU 
jurisprudence recognises that under certain circumstances obligations under multilateral 
treaties, such as the IMF’s Articles – to which all EU Member States are parties but the EU is 
not – may have a direct binding effect on the EU, to the extent that the EU assumes the 
Member States’ competences under the TFEU related to these obligations. Second, the 
exercise of EU Member States’ rights and obligations under the IMF’s Articles indirectly 
affects the EU and EU law. This is because the EU has assumed, or shares with, EU Member 
States certain competences relevant to the IMF’s Articles. Third, the IMF and the EU also 
interact in other areas of common interest, thereby mutually influencing policy positions and 
leading to the use of similar concepts in their respective policies and laws. One example 
concerns the two organisations’ surveillance, the IMF under Article IV of its Articles and the 
EU under a number of procedural frameworks, such as the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Similarly, IMF policy positions on collective action clauses have also impacted EU policy 
decisions. The EU’s legal order is thus rather open to the influence of IMF law.53 
Another example is given by the World Intellectual Property Organization. The EU is 
not a member of the WIPO, whereas all its Member States are. Yet, in light of the strong link 
between the EU and WIPO, the autonomy of the EU in matters of intellectual property is 
relative. The European Union is among the most active international organisations at WIPO. 
The EU has been given either member or observer status by WIPO members for several 
internationally binding agreements and within various decision-making bodies. WIPO’s 
norms, principles and practices are increasingly relevant to the development of intellectual 
                                                
51 E. Cornu, ‘The Impact of Council of Europe Standards on the European Union’ in Wessel and Blockmans, 
Between Autonomy and Dependence 113-129. 
52 P.J. Kuijper and F. Hoffmeister, ‘WTO Influence on EU Law: Too Close for Comfort?’ in Wessel and 
Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 131-158. 
53 W. Bergthaler, ‘The Relationship Between International Monetary Fund Law and European Union Law: 
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property law within the EU legal order. Historically, the EU has incorporated both binding 
and non-binding principles created via the WIPO mechanism. Whereas the WIPO norm-
making process heavily influences the body and framework of intellectual property law in the 
EU, WIPO norms do not have independent normative value within the EU. The EU is not 
bound by new or evolving intellectual property principles unless, by virtue of its own 
authority, it chooses to be. Yet, there is clear evidence that the EU is able to act unilaterally to 
accept or discard intellectual property norms in its legal order.54 
Turning to another specialised agency of the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), it has been observed that, over time, the relationship between the two 
international organisations has shifted from one between equal partners to a more hierarchical 
one between an organization and one of its members. It is exactly because the EU is a full 
member of the FAO that it is not wholly surprising to find that the EU legal order reveals 
substantial FAO influence, notably in five policy fields: fisheries, food law, animal health, 
international food security and forestry. Yet the extent of these effects is ultimately 
determined by the EU legislator and judiciary. The normative impact of the FAO on the EU 
legal order manifests itself chiefly in terms of the direct incorporation of FAO standards in 
EU secondary legislation and in references to FAO standards in both EU policy instruments 
and the case law of the CJEU. In food law and animal health, the influence of the FAO is 
strongest in internal EU rules, whereas in the fields of fisheries, international food security 
and forestry, FAO influence is more prominent in external EU policies and actions.55 
Notwithstanding the fact that the jurisdiction of the CJEU does not extend to Title V 
of the EU Treaty to the same extent as to other policy areas, it is nevertheless interesting to 
note that NATO’s impact on the European Union’s institutional design, policy-making and 
operational experience gathering in the field of security and defence has been “fundamental”, 
even if only a few traces of NATO are to be found in EU primary law. It is especially on the 
operational side, the raison d’être of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, that 
NATO’s impact has been instrumental.56 This is evidenced most vividly by the use, however 
limited in number, of the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, which have enabled the 
European Union to borrow NATO assets and capabilities in order to launch its first-ever 
military mission in 2003 (Proxima in Macedonia) and to continue its activities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea). Similarly, it has been noted that also in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) the EU is bound to respect the norms stemming from 
international organisations. Yet, while the EU legal order is open to external normative 
influences, only a couple of international organisations currently influence the development of 
the AFSJ. The most prominent examples are the United Nations and the Council of Europe, 
                                                
54 E. Kwakwa and A. Talbott, ‘The Influence of the World Intellectual Property Organization on the European 
Union’ in Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 199-216. 
55 F. Schild, ‘The Influence of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the EU Legal Order’ in Wessel 
and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 217-241. 
56 S. Blockmans, ‘The Influence of NATO on the Development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
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which muster the 1951 Geneva Convention on asylum seekers and refugees and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, respectively.57 
Overall, studies over the past years have revealed an impact of many international 
decisions on the EU. These decisions may be taken by both formal international organisations 
and more ‘informal’ transnational, regulatory or treaty bodies.58 Given this influence, the 
question is how we should assess the legal status of these decisions in the EU legal order. 
 
 
5. THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS IN THE EU 
LEGAL ORDER 
 
The preceding chapters in this volume addressed the relationship between international law 
and EU law in more general terms. It was in the Haegeman case59 that the Court presented the 
famous phrase that international agreements concluded by the European Union form “an 
integral part of Union law”. In 2009, the American Air Transport Association and others 
brought judicial review proceedings asking the referring court to quash the measures 
implementing the directive in the United Kingdom.60 In support of their action, they pleaded 
that that directive was unlawful in the light of international treaty law and customary 
international law. In its ruling, the Court nicely summarised the main principles related to the 
effect of international law in the EU legal order. First of all, the Court confirmed that the EU 
is in principle bound by international law. This has indeed been standard case law ever since 
the International Fruit Company case in 1972.61 Second, the Court can examine the validity 
of an act of European Union law in the light of an international treaty only where the nature 
and the broad logic of the latter do not preclude this.62 Finally, where the nature and the broad 
logic of the treaty in question permit the validity of the act of European Union law to be 
reviewed in the light of the provisions of that treaty, it is also necessary that the provisions of 
that treaty which are relied upon for the purpose of examining the validity of the act of 
European Union law appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise.63 
The question of whether this status of international law is restricted to international 
agreements, or also extends to decisions of international organisations, has been less 
frequently discussed. Yet, as rightfully stated by Martenczuk, “international agreements […] 
often establish a common institutional framework, including the creation of joint bodies 
authorized to take decisions with bring effect for the parties.”64 Indeed, one starting point is 
                                                
57 C. Matera, ‘The Influence of International Organisations on the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
A First Inquiry’ in Wessel and Blockmans, Between Autonomy and Dependence 269-296. 
58 See for examples Føllesdal, Wessel and Wouters, Multilevel Regulation and the EU. 
59 Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State. 
60 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines Inc., Continental Airlines Inc., 
United Airlines Inc. v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. 
61 Joined cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit. 
62 See also Joined Cases C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, para 110. 
63 Case C-344/04, Queen on the application of International Air Transport Association v Department for 
Transport (IATA and ELFAA), para 39, and Intertanko (op.cit.), para 45. 
64 B. Martenczuk, ‘EC Law-Making’142.  fn 5. 
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formed by ‘secondary international law’ deriving from international agreements such as 
Association Council decisions. In Sevince – concerning the rights of Turkish workers under 
Decision 2/76 and 1/80 of the EC-Turkey Association Council – the Court held that these 
decisions are also to be seen as forming part of the EU’s legal order and may even have direct 
effect.65 Earlier, the Court already recognised the legal effect of decisions of the same 
Association Council, without being explicit on the actual legal status.66 And, in fact in Greece 
v. Commission, the Court already used Haegeman-like language: “since it is directly 
connected with the Association Agreement, Decision No. 2/80 forms, from the entry into 
force an integral part of the Community legal system”.67 
While one could argue that Association Agreements and their Councils and 
comparable bodies are quite directly connected to the EU’s legal order on the basis of their 
very nature, there are no reasons to limit this reasoning that they constitute international 
bodies (especially when seen from the perspective of the third country) to the Association 
regimes. In Opinion 1/76, in relation to the question as to whether an agreement ‘establishing 
a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels’ is compatible with the provisions of 
the Treaty, the Court argued:  
 
“the Community is […] not only entitled to enter into contractual relations with a third 
country in this connection but also has the power, while observing the provisions of 
the Treaty, to cooperate with that country in setting up an appropriate organism such 
as the public international institution which it is proposed to establish under the name 
of the ‘European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels’.”68 
 
The Court explicitly added that the ‘organism’ may be given “appropriate powers of 
decision”.69 In subsequent situations, such as the establishment and joining of the EU (at the 
time the EC) of the WTO70, the Court underlined this view. The current Treaties do not 
provide for a specific procedure for agreements to establish or join international 
organisations, which implies that the general rules of Article 218 TFEU apply. Indeed Article 
218(1) TFEU refers to “agreements between the Union and third countries or international 
organisations” and Article 218(6)(a)(iii) TFEU mentions “agreements establishing a specific 
institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures” -as one of the cases requiring 
the consent of the European Parliament- (emphasis added). Examples include bilateral 
cooperation agreements, such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, but also other 
types of agreements which include the establishment of bodies with decision-making powers, 
such as the ones dealing with the mutual recognition of technical standards (concluded for 
                                                
65 See for instance: Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie. Cf. also Case C-188/91, Deutsche 
Shell, [1993] ECR I-363, para 17. Cf. also Nanette A.E.M. Neuwahl, 'The European Parliament and Association 
Council Decisions: The example of Decision 1/95 of the EC/Turkey Association Council' (1996) 33 CMLR 51–
68. 
66 Case 204/86, Greece v Council [1988] ECR 5323. 
67 Case 30/88, Greece v Commission [1989] ECR 3711. 
68 Opinion 1/76 re draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels, para 5. 
69 ibid. 
70 Opinion 1/94 re WTO Agreement. 
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instance with the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Bodies are furthermore 
established by for instance the European Economic Area, the Energy Charter Treaty, the 
Energy Community Treaty and the European Common Aviation Area or on the basis of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).71 The latter often use the terms Conference of 
Parties (COPs) or Meeting of Parties (MOPs) to refer to the bodies taking the decisions in the 
framework of MEAs.72 While there is no consensus on whether COPs and MOPs could 
qualify as international organisations, “the fact remains that at the same time COPs/MOPs 
have been endowed with the competence to adopt binding decisions.”73 Or, as another 
observer held: “Like treaties, they compromise a specific normative framework of 
prescriptions that are particularly suitable to organizing internationally coordinated behaviour 
within a limited issue-area. Like international organisations, they provide a permanent 
mechanism for changing these normative prescriptions.”74 
 The link with ‘international agreements’ remains nevertheless important. In the cases 
on decisions by Association Councils, the Court already pointed to the need for these 
decisions to be “directly connected’ with the underlying international agreement. And in the 
absence of any specific provisions on decisions of international organisations, it would indeed 
be Article 218 TFEU that seems to offer the appropriate framework. The term ‘international 
agreements’ was broadly defined by the Court as to include “any undertaking entered into by 
entities subject to international law which has binding force, whatever its form or 
designation”.75 The Court made this assessment in the framework of an Article 218(11) TFEU 
procedure on the basis of which “A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or 
the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement 
envisaged is compatible with the Treaties.” It would seem that in its Opinion the Court should 
also take into account the possible decisions to be adopted by bodies established by 
international agreements.76 
 Apart from the above-mentioned references to international bodies in Article 218, 
paragraph 9 is perhaps even more explicit: 
 
“The Council, on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall adopt a decision suspending 
application of an agreement and establishing the positions to be adopted on the 
Union's behalf in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to 
adopt acts having legal effects, with the exception of acts supplementing or amending 
the institutional framework of the agreement.” 
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While the status of international decisions is still not clear from this provision, at least ‘bodies 
set up by an agreement’ are mentioned. More importantly however is that when introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the procedure only applied to establishing the positions to be 
adopted on behalf of the Community in a body set up by an association agreement. The Nice 
Treaty extended the scope of application of the provision concerned to cover decisions having 
legal effects of bodies set up by any international agreement. It has been argued that “the 
purpose of the introduction of this simplified decision-making procedure was presumably to 
take account of the case law of the Court of Justice according to which the status and effects, 
in the Union legal order, of such decisions of organs created by an international agreement 
concluded by the Community were essentially the same as those of the agreement itself.”77 
Furthermore, there do not seem to be reasons to limit this to treaty bodies set up by 
multilateral conventions, in which case the provision would also apply to ‘regular’ 
international organisations. Indeed, as argued by Heliskoski, Article 218(9)’s main raison 
d’être may flow from the very fact “that decisions of such bodies could have legal effects – 
including direct effect and primacy over secondary legislation – within the Union legal order 
without any subsequent act of adoption by the Union’s institutions”.78 
Yet while international organisations are (by definition) established on the basis of an 
international (constitutive) agreement, the EU is not always a party to that agreement, in 
which case the provisions in Article 218 would not apply and the source for the binding 
character of decisions on the Union should be found elsewhere. In the CITES case, for 
instance, the Commission sought the annulment of the decision of the Council establishing the 
position to be adopted on behalf of the European Community with regard to certain proposals 
submitted at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).79 The Union is not a 
contracting party to CITES; it has observer status at Conferences of the Parties. However, 
since 1982 it has autonomously adopted measures designed to implement within the Union 
the obligations of the Member States deriving from CITES. For the purpose of the present 
contribution the CITES case is also helpful as it clarifies that the Conference of the Parties 
(COPs) of CITES is empowered to adopt amendments to the Appendices to the Convention, 
the entry into force of which is not subject to ratification, and that the decisions of the COPs 
are clearly capable of producing legal effects not only with regard to the Member States as 
parties to CITES but also within the Union’s legal order. Yet the Court did not deal with the 
content of decisions, or their status and effect in Union law, although it has rightfully been 
argued that “the nature and effects of a decision to be taken by an international decision-
making body should […] play a crucial role in determining whether the establishment of the 
position of the Union in such a body should be conceived of as having legal effects in the 
Union legal order.”80  
                                                
77 See the case note by J. Heliskoski, on Case 370/07, Commission v Council [2011] CMLR 555–567 at 557-558. 
78 ibid 558. 
79 Case 370/07, Commission v Council [2009] I-08917.  
80 Heliskoski, Case 370/07364 fn 77. 
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In a recent case, the Court had a chance to clarify the scope of Article 218(9). The case 
relates to decisions taken by the International Organization for Wine and Vine (IOV), of 
which the EU is not a member, but several of its Member States are. Given the EU’s 
competences in the field, its intention is to upgrade its position in the IOV.81 An interesting 
element is that Article 8 of the IOV Agreement allows international organisations to become a 
member of the organization, but so far EU Council Members have not been able to reach 
consensus on this. On 19 June 2012, the Council by qualified majority with Germany voting 
against, adopted a decision establishing an EU position to be adopted in the OIV 82 on the 
basis of Articles 43 and 218(9) TFEU. Germany (itself a member of the OIV) brought an 
action for annulment against that decision challenging Article 218(9) TFEU as the correct 
legal basis for the adoption of the decision.  Germany argued that Article 218(9) TFEU 
concerns only the adoption of the positions of the Union in bodies set up by international 
agreements of which the Union is a member. By contrast, Article 218(9) TFEU cannot be 
applied in relation to the representation of the Member States in bodies of international 
organisations in which only the Member States participate by virtue of separate international 
treaties. Furthermore, Germany took the view that Article 218(9) TFEU covers only “acts 
having legal effects”, meaning acts binding under international law, and that OIV resolutions 
are not acts in that sense. Finally, Germany argued that no other legal basis for the adoption of 
the Council decision is apparent.83 
On 29 April 2014 Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered his Opinion84 and argued 
that Article 218(9) TFEU can only apply to bodies established by agreements to which the 
Union is a party. In its final conclusion the AG holds that Article 218(9) TFEU does not 
provide a suitable legal basis for the decision in the present case. In its judgment of 7 October 
2014 the Court reached a different conclusion.85 It argues that there is nothing in the wording 
of Article 218(9) TFEU to prevent the European Union from adopting a decision establishing 
a position to be adopted on its behalf in a body set up by an international agreement to which 
it is not a party. “Where an area of law falls within a competence of the European Union, such 
as the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the fact that the European Union did not 
take part in the international agreement in question does not prevent it from exercising that 
competence by establishing, through its institutions, a position to be adopted on its behalf in 
the body set up by that agreement, in particular through the Member States which are party to 
that agreement acting jointly in its interest.” (para 52). The question then is whether we are 
dealing with “acts having legal effects”. In that respect the Court argues 
 
“that the recommendations under consideration in the present case […] are capable of 
decisively influencing the content of the legislation adopted by the EU legislature in the area 
                                                
81 G. De Baere, ‘EU Status in International Organisations’ in Tridimas and Schütze, The Oxford Principles of 
European Union Law – vol 1. 
82 Council Document No 11436 ‘establishing the position to be adopted on behalf of the European Union with 
regard to certain resolutions to be voted in the framework of the International Organisation for Vine and Wine 
(OIV)’. 
83 See more extensively De Baere, ‘EU Status in International Organisations’. 
84 C-399/12, Opinion ECLI:EU:C:2014:289, 29/04/2014, Germany v Council. 
85 C-399/12, 01/10/2014, Germany v Council. 
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of the common organization of the wine markets. It follows […] that such recommendations, 
in particular by reason of their incorporation into EU law by virtue of Articles 120f(a), 120g 
and 158a(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1234/2007 and the first subparagraph of Article 9(1) of 
Regulation No 606/2009, have legal effects in that area for the purposes of Article 218(9) 
TFEU and that the European Union, while not a party to the OIV Agreement, is entitled to 
establish a position to be adopted on its behalf with regard to those recommendations, in view 
of their direct impact on the European Union’s acquis in that area.” (para 63-64). 
 
What does this tell us about the status of international decisions in the EU legal order? Can 
we establish a link with Article 216(2) TFEU, on the basis of which “Agreements concluded 
by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States.”? The 
close connection which is visible both in the (modified) treaty provisions and in case law 
between ‘international agreements’ and ‘decisions made by bodies based on international 
agreements’ indeed points to this presumption.86 Following Martenczuk: “to the extent that 
decisions of bodies established by international law have been validly incorporated into Union 
law, they are part of the Union legal order” and hence their uniform interpretation and 
application throughout the Union’s legal order is to be ensured,87 in principle irrespective of 
their direct effect.88 Allegedly this would imply the Court’s jurisdiction to give preliminary 
rulings on the interpretation of the decisions (as was confirmed for Association Council 
decisions in Sevince89). While Article 267 TFEU limits the preliminary procedure to “the 
validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union” 
and ‘acts of other international bodies’ are not included,90 it may be argued that the latter are a 
logical consequence of an earlier ‘act of the institutions’. In addition, sometimes international 
decisions enter the EU legal order only after a decision to that end was adopted by the EU 
institutions.91 Along the same lines the infringement procedure (Article 258 TFEU) applies 
mutatis mutandis. 
Yet even if ‘Decisions based on Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon 
the institutions of the Union and on its Member States’, what, then about decisions by other 
international bodies? While in a ‘CITES-situation’ the Union may have adopted the legal 
effects of decisions of the COPs or another international body, it would be difficult to provide 
a general answer. Decisions by international organisations of which the Union is not a 
                                                
86  A similar conclusion was drawn by Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International 
Organisations and European Law 237-238: ‘decisions of IOs enjoy the same legal status within the Community 
legal order as treaties […] and obtain Community law features such as supremacy over all domestic law of the 
Member States and direct effect it they meet the criteria […]’. See for a recent analysis of the status of 
international agreements M. Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements: Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and 
Judicial Avoidance Techniques (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
87 Martenczuk, ‘EC Law-Making’161. In this quotation Community was replaced by ‘Union’. 
88 Cf. Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International Organisations and European Law 83 (in 
relation to COPs/MOPs decisions). And at 233: ‘the binding decisions are – to a varying degree – 
communitarized, thereby obtaining Community law features, such as supremacy over conflicting secondary EC 
law and all national law of the EU Member States and possible direct effect’. 
89 Case C-192/89 para 10 fn 65. 
90 See on this point also A. Peters, ‘The Position of International Law within the European Community Legal 
Order’(1997) 9 GYIL 12-14. 
91 Martenczuk, ‘EC Law-Making’ 162. 
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member or of bodies based on international agreements to which the EU is not a party (or of 
international bodies not based on an international agreement at all) can have legal effects in 
the sense that they may ‘influence’ EU decision-making, but they would need to be binding 
on the Union to actually enjoy the hierarchically higher status comparable to international 
agreements in order to be able to set aside existing Union law. Conceptually speaking, it does 
not make any difference if an international norm that arrives at the border of the EU legal 
order is generated by an international organization or whether it belongs to a less organized 
body of public international law. In order to have an impact on the EU legal order, all 
international norms will, regardless of their origins, have to be binding on the EU. 
Furthermore, the nature and the broad logic of these international norms should not preclude 
this binding force.92  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The question of the status of decisions by international organisations and other bodies (termed 
‘international decisions’ in this contribution) in the Union’s legal order has gained 
importance. First of all international organisations have changed from international 
frameworks for cooperation to more ‘autonomous’ norm-creating international bodies. 
Secondly, there has been a proliferation of international norm-creating and/or regulatory 
bodies, alongside the already existing formal international governmental organisations. 
Thirdly, the decisions of all these international bodies are more and more influencing each 
other, resulting in a ‘global normative web’ that also impacts the European Union.  
The status of these international decisions in the EU legal order is not as clearly 
regulated or clarified as the status of international agreements and customary law. Yet this 
chapter shows that there are good reasons to follow the Haegeman-doctrine and start from the 
presumption that international decisions form ‘an integral part of EU law’. In fact, the 
doctrinal analysis of the status of international agreements may mutatis mutandis be applied 
to international decisions, including their position ‘between primary and secondary law’, 
keeping in mind that “[w]hilst the EU in principle automatically incorporates treaties it 
concludes into its legal order, it is the EU legal order that will ultimately determine the types 
of internal effect which such Agreements can display and, indeed, can potentially deprive 
them, through ex post review, of internal legal effects where they clash with EU primary 
law.”93 
 Given the wide range of topics covered by international bodies and the diverging legal 
nature of their decisions, this does not make the overall question raised by this contribution 
any easier to answer. Indeed, the question of the reception of the international norms seems to 
be decisive in establishing their status. This line of reasoning points to a more dynamic 
influence of international law on the EU. Where negotiations on international agreements may 
very well take the ‘primary law’ aspects of the agreement into consideration, it is much more 
difficult to predict any ‘secondary law’ based on the agreement. Yet following the 
                                                
92 Cf. van Rossem, op.cit. 
93 Mendez, The Legal Effects of EU Agreements 320  fn 89. 
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interpretation of both the treaty provisions and the relevant case law it would be difficult to 
come to a different conclusion. Once the EU has joined an international organization or 
becomes a party to an international agreement on the basis of which international decisions 
can be taken, these decisions not only influence the EU legal order, but – when binding – also 
become an integral part of that order. The presumption suggested above would at least hold 
for decisions of Association Councils (and similar bodies) and for decisions of bodies (and 
conferences of state parties) based on agreements to which the Union is a party or where it 
has accepted the legal effects through internal legislation. As such, these decisions may also 
obtain EU law features such as supremacy and possible direct effect – features that they 
previously did not necessarily possess.94 This may even be possible in cases where the EU 
itself is not a member of the particular international organization (such as in the case of the 
ICAO) or treaty regime (CITES). In cases where Member States are not a member of an 
international organization, but the EU is (for instance the regional fisheries organisations), the 
international decisions reach the Member States as (supreme) EU law and not as international 
law of which the status is determined by their national constitutions.95 The possible impact of 
international decisions on fundamental rights, the principles of democracy and rule of law, 
have been analysed extensively, in particular in the context of the Kadi saga. 
The fact remains that, unlike international agreements, international decisions usually 
do not require ratification to enter into force. This may be particularly problematic when the 
notion of ‘international decisions as integral part of EU law’ is combined with majority 
decision-making at the international level, potentially allowing non-EU members to create 
supreme EU law. Again, this issue became apparent in many of the anti-terrorism cases. At 
the same time it is clear that in most cases international bodies work on the basis of consensus 
or offer a way to opt out. 
Decisions by international organisations or other international bodies can have legal 
effects in the sense that they may ‘influence’ EU decision-making, but they would need to be 
binding on the Union to actually enjoy the hierarchically higher status comparable to 
international agreements in order to be able to set aside existing EU law. Conceptually 
speaking therefore, it does not make any difference if an international norm that arrives at the 
border of the EU legal order is generated by an international organization or whether it 
belongs to a less organized body of public international law. In order to have an impact on the 
EU legal order, all international norms will, regardless of their origins, have to be binding on 
the EU.   
 
                                                
94 Cf. Lavranos,  Legal Interaction between Decisions of International Organisations and European Law 238. 
95Lavranos noted an interesting correlation between the instruments used for implementation of decisions of 
international organisations and the EU scope of competence: ‘In the case of exclusive competence of the EC ( 
Fisheries, SC, GATT), the EC uses Regulations as the main instrument, whereas in the cases of concurrent 
competences, the EC appears to prefer Directives as the main instrument for the implementation of decisions of 
IOs – although sometimes also Regulations or Council Decisions are used. Also in the case where the EC is not a 
member of the IO (ICAO), the EC used Directives when it implements Annexes adopted by the ICAO Council.’. 
